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The original purpose of copyright legislation was to grant a temporary economic monopoly to an 
author of a creative work. This monopoly is meant to incentivize authors to contribute to the 
public good with works that promote progress in scien e and art. However, increases in the 
scope and duration of copyright terms grant overly b oad protections and controls for copyright 
owners, while advances in technology have provided th  public with the potential for near-
limitless access to information. This creates a conflict between proprietary interest in creative 
works versus the public’s right and ability to access same. Efforts to balance these competing 
interests must consider the history and changing role of copyright in America, the role of the 
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The Purpose of Copyright 
Copyright is an important concept in modern society. Its presence determines in part what 
movies, music, and books audiences encounter througout their lives, as well as how they 
encounter those creative works. But the purpose of copyright itself is commonly misunderstood, 
as there are many who believe that the primary purpose of copyright is a protection for authors 
against those who would steal their work.1 However, while this belief may influence how 
copyright is used by authors, publishers, and audiences today, it is not the original stated legal 
purpose. The stated purpose of copyright, dating back to the U.S. Constitution, is instead to 
promote the public good by advancing knowledge, which is done through incentivizing authors 
with an exclusive, though temporary, privilege of cpyright. 
In his essay “How to Make Wealth,” computer programmer and essayist Paul Graham 
posits that the biggest incentive for technological progress is simply employing the rule of law to 
allow those who innovate in areas of creative expression to keep the fortune they amass from the 
market demand for such innovation.2 Arguing for the advancement of society, then, the 
American government has long endorsed the practice of granting a copyright, or the exclusive 
privilege of duplication and distribution in the marketplace, to the authors of such works, so as to 
“promote the progress of science and the useful arts,” in the language of the United States 
Constitution.3 
However, one of the key components of this system of incentives, namely innovation, 
suffers when the privileges granted by copyright legislation are too broad. This thesis will first 
                                               
1 L. Ray Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users Rights 
(Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1991). 
2 Paul Graham, Hackers and Painters: Big Ideas from the Computer Age (Sebastopol, CA: 
O’Reilly Media, 2004). Graham’s example is specifically in regards to software code. 
3 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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argue that privileges granted by recent copyright legislation are too broad in scope, duration, and 
proprietary control, which leads to interminable economic monopolies on certain creative works, 
and that a brief overview of copyright law in American history demonstrates that this is in 
conflict with the stated purpose of copyright throughout the previous two centuries. Second, this 
thesis will illustrate how these privileges are now coupled with legislative and technological 
regulations meant to limit access to information, so that copyright owners are able to sustain 
business practices without fear of competition from the public domain and disruptive innovators. 
Ultimately, this thesis will argue that future innovation in science and the useful arts is 
endangered if automatic technological regulation of activities through appliancized devices, and 
laws that buttress such regulation, supplants an individual's property rights and fair use rights in 
engaging with intellectual property and creative works in a generative manner. 
The stated purpose of copyright, to advance the public good through progress in science 
and art, has shifted towards the current reality of copyright as a complete proprietary control over 
how creative works are accessed and used. With digital technologies, copyright owners now 
have the ability to determine how creative works are ccessed and used even after a purchase is 
made, which confounds and possibly infringes the prope ty rights of the user. Increased control 
also allows entrenched business interests to unilaterally determine that the creative expression of 
an individual author is derivative of a work under copyright, so that disruptive competition is 
again stymied, and the First Amendment rights of that individual potentially infringed upon. 
As the First Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees, Congress shall 
pass no law abridging the freedom of speech. Unfortunately, American laws regarding copyright 
have expanded the scope, duration, and control of copyright so as to endanger freedoms of 
political and creative expression through the increasingly broad legal interpretations of what 
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constitutes a derivative work. Copyright, as defined by Howard Abrams in his article “The 
Historic Foundation of Copyright Law,” is “the exclusive right to manufacture, distribute, and 
sell copies of the work in question.”4 That definition, as well as the language of early American 
copyright laws, makes clear that copyright is meant to limit the actions of publishers. However, 
recent changes in the scope of copyright, as well as advances in technology, have allowed almost 
any individual to act as a publisher online of works that are intended to be transformative, but are 
often found by the courts to be derivative and in breach of statutory copyright protections.  
This is also exacerbated by two competing legal perceptions on copyright. One 
perception views the public’s interest as paramount, a d treats copyright as a monopoly granted 
for a limited time to an author. This limited time was originally 14 years, with an option to renew 
a copyright term for an additional 14 years. The other perception is of copyright as an essential 
natural property right, with the act of creation granting the author protection by excluding others 
from exploiting his property. This perception has led to copyright terms that can now last up to 
95 years, and is at direct odds with the intentions f the Framers of the Constitution. 
The intentions of the Framers should be taken into account when considering 
contemporary legal interpretations for the Constitution. As Robert Bork states in his book The 
Tempting of America, the only valid way to interpret the Constitution is through those intentions, 
from which judges should seek “enlightenment from the structure of the document and the 
government it created.”5 Based on the language present in the first article of the United States 
Constitution, which states that the primary objective of copyright is “to promote the Progress of 
                                               
4 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the 
Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29 (1983): 1119-1191. 
5 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Free 
Press, 1990): 165 
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Science and the useful Arts,”6 it seems clear the intention of the founding fathers, particularly 
James Madison of Virginia, in drafting a copyright clause, was to simultaneously champion the 
theory of public benefit from intellectual works and to discourage monopolies. Again, those 
monopolies discouraged often take the form of publishers, but the point is confounded when any 
modern individual has all the technological power of an 18th century publisher in their own 
home. The primary goals behind copyright legislation were not just to protect the rights of 
authors through incentive, but also to advance public knowledge, so that a monopoly was in 
effect granted to authors for a limited time.  
The copyright clause in the United States Constitution was a near copy of the language of 
Britain’s Statute of Anne. The stated purpose for the clause in the Constitution itself makes it 
clear that the public good is the primary impetus for copyright legislation, but the founders did 
not necessarily believe that such a goal was incompatible with incentives made for authors. As 
James Madison explains in The Federalist Papers. “The Public good fully coincides...with the 
claims of individuals.”7 Thomas Jefferson also made a similar point in a letter from 1813, in 
which he stated, “Society may give exclusive right to he profits arising from [intellectual 
property], as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may 
or may not be done...without claim or complaint from anybody.”8  
Many authors, including Lawrence Lessig, Glynn Lunney, and William Fisher, have 
since argued that if the government wants to serve the public good in learning and improving 
upon the past, then copyright, if it existed at all, should be brief and narrow, encouraging even 
                                               
6 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
7 As quoted in Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, "The Statue of Anne and its Progeny: Variations 
Without a Theme,” Houston Law Review, 47 (2010): 965-1011, p. 987 
8 Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 13 Aug. 1813, in The Founders’ Constitution ed. by 
Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, 5 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 3:42 
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geniuses to develop newer work after such a term expires.9 Further, an argument for natural 
rights and creative control is moot if any copying of the work in question does not impede the 
creator’s own use of that work. Even judicial opinions have historically favored public good over 
author’s rights. "The copyright law ... makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."10 
Copyright is frequently discussed in the extant litera ure as it relates to the competing 
notions of incentives and access. In his article “Rexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access 
Paradigm,” Glynn Lunney notes that incentivizing authors to produce new works must in some 
way, most often economically, limit the ability of the public to access such works.11 Lunney and 
others have argued in the literature concerning copyright legislation that such incentives and 
proprietary protections provided to authors since the original copyright statute in 1790 are 
unwarranted, and are at best “superficially attractive”12 in justifying the expansion of copyright. 
But in order to best understand the current protections afforded to copyright owners, it is 
necessary to first briefly recap the history of copyright law in America, tracking the major 
changes made to copyright’s scope and duration. 
 
Copyright: Origins and Evolutions 
Statutory copyright itself was born with the Statute of Anne in Great Britain, the first 
statute to provide copyright protections by the government instead of by private parties. Enacted 
                                               
9 Lessig, arguing against copyright term expansions n the Supreme Court case of Eldred v. 
Aschroft, prepared a brief signed by seventeen economists, includi g Ronald Coase, James 
Buchanan, Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and Georg Akerlof, stating that extending the 
terms of existing copyrights would do nothing to increase incentives to create. Lawrence Lessig, 
Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control 
Creativity, (New York, Penguin: 2006): p. 166 
10 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) 
11 Glynn S. Lunney Jr., "Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm," Vanderbilt Law 
Review 49 (1996): 483-656. 
12 ibid, p. 655 
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by Parliament in 1710, its full title was “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by vesting 
the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or Purchasors [sic] of such Copies during the Times 
therein mentioned.” This was originally done because it was seen as important for government to 
offer some form of exclusive rights in expressive works. Otherwise, the argument goes, without 
any kind of financial incentive, the literary world would remain stagnant, as authors would fear 
that others, primarily publishers, would reap the benefits of their intellectual labor by freely 
copying literary works. As the preamble to the Statute of Anne asserted, “Printers Booksellers 
and other Person have of late frequently taken the Lib rty of printing, reprinting and publishing, 
or causing to be printed reprinted or published Books and other Writings without the consent of 
the Authors or Proprietors of such Books and Writings to their very great Detriment and too 
often to the Ruin of them and their Families...”13 A tad hyperbolic, to be sure, but in an age 
before digital distribution, the high cost of printing, binding, and distributing led to a 
concentration of those capabilities in the hands of a few publishers. In Britain at the time of the 
Statute of Anne’s passing, royal entitlements also concentrated this power even more, so that in 
effect the Stationer’s Company held a monopoly on the book trade. 
The Statute of Anne had the stated purpose of promoting learning, but was in actuality 
more a trade-regulation statute to break the monopoly of the Stationer’s Company for printing 
and selling books. “By providing coverage that was n rrow (owners were protected only against 
unconsented wholesale reproduction of books) and of brie  duration, proprietors would get 
enough protection to make the publishing business attractive but not so much that they could 
damage the public welfare through sustained high prices or lengthy periods of control.”14 Such 
                                               
13 Great Britain, Statutes at Large, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) 
14 Zimmerman (2010), p. 974 
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lengthy periods of control are exactly what ends up ha pening with American copyright 
legislation, although it takes several hundred years to get to that point. 
Opinions about copyright in the American colonies during the latter half of the 18th 
century were heavily informed by an admiration for and jealousy of Britain's literary heritage. 
The early patriotic view, as expressed by Bugbee, was that the “dignity of the young republic 
required a crown of literary achievement.”15 In trying to foster an environment for such literary 
achievement, then, early American intellectuals such as Thomas Paine argued for legislative 
action that would create stronger financial incentives for the creation and controlled distribution 
of intellectual works. In his Letter to the Abbe Raynal,16 Paine stated “that the state of literature 
in America must one day become a subject of legislative consideration. Hitherto it hath been a 
disinterested volunteer in the service of the Revoluti n, and no man thought of profits; but when 
peace shall give time and opportunity for study, the country will deprive itself of the honour and 
service of letters, and the improvement of science, unless sufficient laws are made to prevent 
depredation on literary property.” And when such legislation was eventually passed, much of it 
was founded on the example set by British copyright law and the Statute of Anne in particular. 
Other American citizens who were early champions for copyright included Andrew Law 
and Noah Webster, although these two gentlemen were not necessarily interested in securing 
copyright protection for their fellow man. Instead, both of these men sought private copyrights, 
and petitioned the Connecticut legislature for such. Law received a private copyright for a 
collection of psalmody in October, 1781, while Noah Webster specifically made request “for a 
                                               
15 B.W. Bugbee, The Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law, (Washington, D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1967): p. 104 
16 Full title: Letter to the Abbe Raynel, on the Affairs of North America; in which the Mistakes in 
the Abbes Account of the Revolution of America are Corrected and Cleared up (1782), collected 
in Political Works of Thomas Paine (London, 1817) 
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law to secure to me the copy-right of my proposed book”17 on October 24, 1782. The proposed 
book was Webster’s Dictionary, titled The Grammatical Institute of the English Language, a 
work of such monumental undertaking that to deny it sta utory protection would have bordered 
on cruel. 
The petitions for private copyright eventually led to a general copyright statute in 
Connecticut, passed in January, 1783. This “Act for he Encouragement of Literature and 
Genius” in turn set a precedent that the other state  eventually followed, again with help from the 
direct petition of Webster, who engaged in a long serie  of correspondence with James Madison 
throughout the years. In a letter dated July, 1784, Webster wrote to Madison with the request that 
Madison would consider adopting a copyright statute in Virginia. “The Grammatical Institute of 
the English Language is so much approved in the Northern States, that I wish to secure to myself 
the copyright in all.”18 He goes on to write that the periods of statutory protection in states with a 
general copyright law ranged from 14 to 20 years, with some (like Connecticut), offering to 
renew statutory protection for an additional 14 years. He also notes the inherent reciprocity 
common to all these statutes: “[A]ll give the inhabit nts of other States, the benefit of the laws, 
as soon as the State where the author is an inhabitant shall have passed a similar law.” But again, 
Webster’s notion to pass a general copyright law was secondary to his own personal interest: 
“[I]f the Legislature shall not think proper to pass a general Law; be pleased to present a petition 
in my name for a [particular] law securing to me & my heirs & assigns the exclusive right of 
publishing & vending the above mentioned works in the State of Virginia for the term of twenty 
years - or for such other term as the Legislature shall think proper.” It is possible that from this 
correspondence, Madison began to see the benefits of a general copyright statute in encouraging 
                                               
17 Bugbee (1967) p. 107 
18 Letter from Noah Webster to James Madison, Hartford, Connecticut (1784), Primary Sources 
on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org 
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authors to create and publish intellectual works such as Webster’s book, for the Virginia Act was 
passed on October 17, 1785, with a statutory term of 21 years. This act also set penalties for the 
breach of copyright at double the value of copies reprinted without permission. 
Eventually, each state had passed laws granting statutory protection with New York 
being the last on April 29, 1786. Several of these state statutes on copyright were passed in 
response to the Continental Congress’ resolution “recommending the several States to secure to 
the Authors or Publishers of New Books the Copyright of such Books.”19 Eight of these state 
statutes directly defined the purpose and reason for copyright. The purpose was to secure profits 
for the author, and the reason for that was to encourage authors to create new works that would 
encourage learning. If this is interpreted literally, then access to those works, provided that 
access did not infringe on an author’s ability to sell his own works, would be supremely 
important. But as Patterson states, the pragmatic reason was more simply to prevent piracy of 
printed works and provide order for the book trade.20 However, eventually the author’s rights 
must give way to the paramount rights of society, so that any monopoly on copyright must be 
limited in term. 
The states could have theoretically continued to grant the security of copyright on a case-
by-case basis, as was done for Webster and Law. Instead, the path was set for a national law that 
would define the statutory copyright terms afforded to any man seeking them. As Madison stated 
in his Federalist Papers, “The states cannot separately make effectual provision for [copyright].” 
A national consensus would have to be met, and so it was as the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia began in May, 1787. Its fifth written proposal was to protect the works of authors 
                                               
19 U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Laws of the United States of America 1783-1862, 1 (1962) 
20 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University 
Press, 1968): p. 183 
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and inventors, and this was unanimously accepted. On August 18, 1787, two sets of proposals 
regarding intellectual property were introduced at the Convention to revise the Articles of 
Confederation. The first was from James Madison, with nine proposed Congressional powers 
and the other by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, who proposed 11 Congressional powers. 
There is some speculation that Pinckney possibly copied Madison in some of his proposals. His 
own contributions centered on patents, specifically the creation of a Federal power to issues 
patents of invention.21 But it would be several more years before a Federal law was enacted 
regarding copyright, and the law passed separated the protections afforded to literary works 
versus inventive works.  
On January 28, 1790, Aedanus Burke of South Carolina presented “a bill for securing the 
copy-right of books to authors and proprietors,”22 which is notable for separating legislation 
having to do with inventive property versus literary p operty. Several different forms of bills for 
both patent and copyright made the rounds of legislature before President Washington signed a 
bill into law on May 31, 1790, providing a legal basis for a Federal copyright system, with a 14 
year statutory term and the option to renew for an additional 14 years. Although this Federal 
copyright act was a step beyond private copyrights, t e statutory protections it afforded were not 
granted automatically, as they are today. Instead, the act of 1790 stated that an author seeking 
statutory protection for his work was to deposit a copy of it with the clerk of the district court 
where he lived, in addition to sending a second copy t  the U.S. Secretary of State within six 
months. The law also removed limitations on the author’s ability to set a market price for his 
work, which had been a standard part of copyright legislation previously, beginning with the 
Statute of Anne. On June 14, 1790, John Barry regist red The Philadelphia Spelling Book, 
                                               
21 Bugbee (1967) p. 126 
22 Bugbee (1967) p. 138 
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arranged upon a plan entirely new, ith the District Court of Pennsylvania, making it the first 
book to receive statutory protection under the new law.
It is worth noting that while the second section of the Federal Copyright Act defined a 
potential infringement of a copyright as selling a work which infringed a copyright, this did not 
apply to foreign works, as section five explicitly permitted the piracy of such. “That nothing in 
this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting, or 
publishing within the United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or 
published by any person not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the 
jurisdiction of the United States.”23 So Americans were free to copy and distribute the li erary 
works of Britain and other nations without remunerating the authors. This makes clear the 
nationalistic tenor towards copyright at the time, and the patriotic interest in developing an 
American literary canon, but not necessarily a globa  literary canon.  
In fact, a lack of official recognition for foreign copyrights existed for another century in 
America. According to historian James Barnes, the issue of international copyright was of little 
concern to America in the years following the Napoleonic wars, and most literature was 
imported from England.24 But since this importation was initially of physical books bought from 
English publishers, there was obviously less of an impetus to create any statutory protections for 
the intellectual works themselves. Manuscripts from England did began to find their way into 
pirated published books in America, though, and a fervor started to grow for the creation of an 
Anglo-American copyright treaty. 
                                               
23 Library of Congress: 1 Stat. 124 (1790) Sec. 5 Copyright Act, New York. Primary Sources on 
Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org 
24 James J. Barnes, Authors, Publishers and Politicians: The Quest for an Anglo-American 
Copyright Agreement 1815-1854, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974): p. 49 
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However, American citizens seeking reform to copyright legislation in the 19th century 
still tended to be motivated by national, not interational, interests. On February 3, 1831, “An 
Act to Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copyright” was signed, and it extended the term of 
copyright for American authors from 14 to 28 years with an option to renew for an additional 14. 
Also, if the author died, his widow or children could apply for the extension. Congressman 
Guilian C. Verplanck, who was considered a member of the American literati, was instrumental 
in the drafting and passage of this law. Another memb r of the House of Representatives, 
William W. Ellsworth, who also championed the term extensions present in the act, likely did so 
not entirely for patriotic reasons, but for familial ones. Ellsworth was married to the eldest 
daughter of Noah Webster, a man who had sought copyright protections for his spelling books 
since 1783, and continued to do so more than 50 years later. While waiting on the President’s 
signature of the passed bill, Webster wrote, “This law will add much to the value of my [literary] 
property,”25 demonstrating the source of his own, chiefly financi l, interest in statutory copyright 
protection. 
Court decisions at the time also solidified the treatment of copyright as a statutory 
protection. Specifically, the landmark case of Wheaton v. Peters26 firmly established the 
principle of copyright as a statute. The origin of the case was a dispute between two men, 
Richard Peters and Henry Wheaton, over the right to publish the decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Peters succeeded Wheaton as reporter for the United States Supreme Court in June 1828. 
He planned to publish, or more accurately re-publish, court decisions that were reported by his 
predecessors, including Wheaton. Wheaton and his publisher, Robert Donaldson, filed a bill in 
the Pennsylvania Circuit Court against Peters and his publisher, John Griggs, seeking an 
                                               
25 Barnes (1974) p. 51 
26 Wheaton v. Peters 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) 
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injunction. Judge Joseph Hopkinson delivered the opini n in circuit court that because Wheaton 
had not secured statutory protection for his previous publishing of court decisions, he was not 
entitled to government protection now. 
The case was appealed, and the Supreme Court decide in January, 1834, that opinions of 
the court could not be copyrighted. Justice John McLean, in delivering the opinion of the 
majority, stated, “It may be proper to remark, that the court are unanimously of opinion, that no 
reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court; and that 
the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”27 The majority held that there 
was no common law copyright at the federal level, nor the state level (Pennsylvania), nor even in 
England. The second main point of the case was that requirements for securing copyright under 
the Copyright Act were mandatory and must be strictly followed to ensure statutory protection.  
Dissenting opinions in the case stressed that an author should have natural rights that 
automatically protect his property as a matter of justice and equality. So the premises of the 
majority and dissenters were at polar opposites, with the majority emphasizing the interest of the 
public, and the dissenters that of the individual author. In the end, copyright was ultimately 
defined as a statutory grant of a monopoly for the benefit of the author, and not a product of 
common law. This case set the assumptions for copyright in America as favoring the public 
domain and the public’s right to access over the author’s interests, although those were not 
excluded entirely. What authors were primarily protected from before that, and what was 
misunderstood as common law, was the unauthorized publication of an unpublished manuscript, 
which is more a right to privacy than a copyright. The court also referred directly to the decision 
                                               
27 (33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668) However, marginal notes, abstracts, index notes, and other 
intellectual works created by the court reporter or others could indeed be copyrighted. 
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in England’s House of Lords in 1774 as the ruling precedent, and declared that by the statute of 
1790, Congress did not affirm an existing right, but created a right. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wheaton v. Peters made it difficult for those arguing for 
an international copyright agreement, since the Federal government was unlikely to grant 
statutory protection to foreigners, and thus any previously published foreign manuscripts were 
fair game for American publishers. Still, in the fall of 1837, a select committee of six in the 
Senate was formed by Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky to discuss the issue of securing 
copyrights for foreign works. Clay wanted an international copyright agreement, but President 
James Buchanan was against it, with a stated reason that would surely have made Webster 
bristle: “But to live in fame was as great a stimulus to authors as pecuniary gain; and the question 
ought to be considered, whether they [British authors] would not lose as much of fame by the 
measure asked for, as they would gain in money.”28 The implication was clear: American authors 
should be financially incentivized with statutory protection, but foreigners should be happy just 
to be known by the American public. 
Other prominent opponents of international copyright, such as author P.H. Nicklin, made 
the argument that British books were more expensive than American pirate versions, and thus an 
unfair financial burden on American citizens.29 In his book “Remarks on Literary Property,” 
Nicklin wrote that “...an immense amount of capital s employed in publishing books, in printing, 
in binding, in making paper and types, and stereotype plates, and printing presses, and binders’ 
presses and their other tools; in making leather and cloth, and thread, and glue, for binders; in 
copper plates, in copyrights, and in buildings in which these occupations are conducted.”30 
                                               
28 Register of Debates in Congress 24th Cong. 2nd Sess., XIII (2 February 1837), pp. 670-1 
29 The American book trade, like other businesses, also suffered as a result of a national 
depression from 1837-1843. 
30 P.H. Nicklin, “Remarks on Literary Property,” (1837) 
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Nicklin’s knowledge of publishing came from his long-term business relationship with the firm 
of Carey & Lea, a Philadelphia publisher that thrived from the reproduction of English works. 
Nicklin’s rhetoric may have emphasized the public good by keeping prices low, but like 
Webster, his own financial self-interest played a role in his position on international copyright. 
Senator Clay introduced a copyright bill that would include an Anglo-American 
copyright agreement three times between 1838 and 1842, but each was unsuccessful in securing 
congressional support. By 1842, it was clear that an international copyright agreement would not 
be passed any time soon, despite the efforts of authors like Charles Dickens, who toured America 
in 1842 in part to promote the cause. While some derided Dickens for being insensitive to the 
economic plight of Americans during the then-current depression, Senator Clay remarked that 
American publishers of foreign works were disingenuous about the costs of remunerating 
Dickens and other popular British authors: “[The book printers] bring forward highly 
exaggerated statements both of the extent of Capital employed and the ruin that would be 
inflicted by the proposed provision for Foreign authors.”31 
The Copyright Act was revised again in 1870,32 but its major change to existing law was 
that the Librarian of Congress was made the official copyright officer, and two copies were 
required to be filed with this person no later than te  days after publication in order to secure 
statutory copyright protection. This Copyright Act still allowed for the free publication of foreign 
works. This changed in 1891, thanks in part to efforts by the Authors' and Publishers' Copyright 
Leagues. Congress introduced a provisional statute to copyright law giving the protection of 
copyright to the works of foreign authors and artists. By that time, American authors and 
publishers had their own concerns about the strength of American copyright abroad, and several 
                                               
31 Barnes (1974) p. 73 
32 Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198 
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European nations were prepared to “extend reciprocal protection to the productions of 
Americans.”33 Clearly, it took the threat of a negative economic i pact abroad for American 
copyright holders to acquiesce to an Anglo-American opyright treaty. 
More than 200 copyright bills had been introduced in Congress by 1904, prompting the 
Register of Copyrights to state, “The [copyright] laws as they stand fail to give the protection 
required, are difficult of interpretation, application, and administration, leading to 
misapprehension and misunderstanding, and in some directions are open to abuses.”34 
Unfortunately, this was not about to change anytime soon, and the copyright laws of the 20th 
century would prove to be even more misunderstood than hose of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
 
20th Century Expansions 
The Copyright Act of 190935 established a term of twenty-eight years with a like renewal 
term, for a total fifty-six year term limit on copyright. This act also furthered the scope of the 
statutory protections and limited monopolies provided by law, with copyright holders granted the 
exclusive right to publish or re-publish, translate, adapt, or perform intellectual works. An earlier 
form of the bill included a common law clause “"that subject to the limitations and conditions of 
this Act copyright secured hereunder shall be entitl d to all the rights and remedies which would 
be accorded to any other species of property at common law,”36 but this was not enacted in the 
law itself. However, before publication, the author of a copyrightable work now explicitly 
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received common law protection and could seek damages by civil action from any unauthorized 
publisher. In addition, the Copyright Act of 1909 allowed for advertising labels and merchandise 
tags to be copyrighted as well. All of these amendments to copyright law have encouraged the 
point of view that copyright is an entitlement or natural right, and not a privilege granted by the 
state. The view of copyright as a natural right of man has also led to cultural shifts that helped to 
change the legal definition of trademarks to include intellectual property rights. These shifts have 
traditionally aided publishers and corporations more than individual authors, which is at direct 
odds with the intentions of the Constitutional Framers in limiting monopolies. 
The Copyright Act of 1909 still required affirmative notice on the part of the author to 
gain statutory protection, but this changed as the view of copyright as entitlement gained in 
popularity throughout the 20th century. Authors who publish today, under the 1976 act, enjoy 
automatic statutory protection, for a term of life plus 50 years. The Act also created a 75 year 
statutory term for anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, so that an 
individual seeking to reproduce a creative work would have to prove that it was in the public 
domain, but potentially be unable to identify who owned the copyright. These changes to 
copyright had the unintended consequence of automatically providing statutory protection to 
authors who are not motivated by incentives. As Brad Greenberg points out in his comment on 
instant authorship37, returning to a system where authors must opt-in to receive a copyright on 
works would unnecessarily hinder authors who are inc ntivized by the current regime. However, 
if an author chooses an option of copyleft, creative commons, or some other form of copyright 
opt-out, there is no hindrance to them doing so, financial or otherwise. And there is potential for 
abuse in either an opt-in or opt-out copyright system, at least in terms of the continually shifting 
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balance between legislation and expectation of statutory protections. As authors are further 
incentivized, they “respond to continually increasing expectations, which Congress supports 
through periodic expansion of copyright.”38 
And that periodic expansion continued with the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act (CTEA) of 1998, through which Congress lengthened statutory protection to a term of life of 
the author plus 70 years.39 Publishers and corporations that solicit works made for hire gained 
even greater statutory protection of intellectual property, with terms lasting as long as 95 years. 
The combination of longer terms, automatic statutory protection, and broader rights of 
monopolistic exploitation has thus led to an “evoluti n of copyright from little more than a 
prohibition on literal duplication to broader and more sophisticated concepts of intellectual 
plagiarism.”40 This is most evident in the last century in how the erms of art used in defining the 
role of copyright in America have changed. Fair use, a concept which is derived from the idea of 
copying a significant portion of the original work for non-commercial use, is often inexorably 
linked by copyright law to the concepts of plagiarism and piracy. Although it is unethical to 
plagiarize another work by copying a whole or part of the work without citation, legal 
protections against plagiarism must be balanced against whether a work is strictly copied, 
derivative of an original work, or so transformative of another work as to be fairly interpreted as 
an original work itself. If this spectrum is properly considered, then copyright laws will protect 
only fixed creative works from undue duplication, ad not grant any author or copyright owner a 
monopoly on ideas expressed creatively. Such a cultural monopoly would be anathema to the 
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stated goals of copyright law, where the stated purpose is only to provide a trade regulation for a 
temporary economic monopoly. 
Copyright law, then, was not intended to treat ideas as property, nor grant proprietary 
interest in such. No common law recognizes the creative interest of the author, and statutory 
protection is only granted to the copyright holder. So when a publisher is the owner of a 
copyright, authors do not receive creative interest pro ections, and do not possess any legal rights 
to determine how their ideas are used. An author’s economic and creative interests are thus 
stymied. Despite the stated goals of the founding fathers in drafting American copyright laws for 
the promotion of learning, copyright itself is basically no more than a trade-regulation device 
designed to protect against competing economic exploitation of intellectual property. As 
Patterson states, one of the greatest ironies of copyright law is that “in a society where there was 
no freedom of ideas, copyright protected only against piracy; in a society where there is freedom 
of ideas, copyright protects against plagiarism.”41 And legal protection of ideas, or intellectual 
property, unnecessarily restricts not just access to those ideas, but also the freedom of expression 
that exists as a principle of liberty in America. 
This threat to freedom for expression answers the question of why changes in copyright 
law is an issue relevant to communication scholars. As Stephen A. Smith states in “The Import 
of Three Constitutional Provisions,” the Constitutional Framers were committed to the discovery 
and production of new ideas, and intended a wide diffusion of ideas and knowledge.42 Madison 
even wrote in his “Essay on Monopolies” that governme t should have “a right to extinguish the 
monopoly [of patents and copyrights] by paying a specified and reasonable sum.”43 And this 
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proposed governmental protocol to extinguish a copyright is contrasted by the “crown copyright” 
of Britain and its commonwealth nations. 
Crown copyright, a result of legislation regarding copyright in Britain in 1911, 1956, and 
1988, grants the British government a perpetual comm n law copyright for works created or 
published under the direct supervision of the Crown.44 Such a system allows for the government 
to potentially censor and control perceived seditious ideas. However, in America, with the 
decision of Wheaton v. Peters that prevented a copyright from being attached to the opinions of 
the court, the function of copyright was shown not as an instrument of control, but for the spread 
of knowledge and ideas, which is anathema to the near-p rpetual statutory protections granted to 
publishers in this country today. 
Another frustrating aspect of extended statutory protection for economic reasons is that 
the limits on freedom of expression and creativity do not generally result in an economic boon 
for copyright holders. As Justice Breyer remarked in a dissenting opinion during the case of 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, close to 98 percent of copyrights are worthless after bout half a century45, so 
to continue to grant statutory protection to those works is an unnecessary impediment to public 
access. And an impediment to public access is an impediment to learning, the most clearly stated 
purpose of all American copyright legislation for more than 200 years. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to prove that the public’s need to access works is endangered 
by overly-broad copyright protections. When Congress is lobbied by corporations seeking ever-
greater terms of copyright, this does not appear to overtly interfere with the production of new 
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works or create undue monopolization.46 Therefore, each new piece of copyright legislation 
continues to expand the term of copyright, as well as ensuring a system where an author is 
legally entitled to the full value associated with an authored work. However, public access is not 
the only risk associated with broad copyright terms. There is also the possibility that broad 
copyright terms do not “promote the progress of scien e and the useful arts.” 
Lunney argues that the variety of new works of authors ip that comes as a result of broad 
copyright protections is not inherently valuable to society. From a legal and economic 
perspective, there must be justification for devoting resources towards creating and enforcing 
statutory copyright protections, since society does not benefit from the production of additional 
works created because of an inability to access existing works that would serve the same 
purpose. Under the current system of copyright, those who unlawfully access or distribute 
copyrighted works are infringing the statutory copyright of an author and are subject to fine or 
imprisonment. 
Granting a right to access and use materials that would otherwise result in infringing an 
author’s copyright is the ostensible purpose of the fair use doctrine. But William Fisher, in his 
article “Reconstructing the fair use doctrine,” states that there is an incoherence in how fair use is 
used in legal settings.47 Similar to Lunney, Fisher argues that copyright’s present legal form is 
economically inefficient, and that the courts can best improve that efficiency through a revised 
litmus test for whether a use of a copyrighted work is considered fair or not. The crux of Fisher’s 
litmus test is that a producer of a work which has been infringed must prove “substantial harm”48 
resulting from the infringement. However, this substantial harm is too broadly defined, so that an 
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application of fair use in legal doctrine would remain unpredictable even with Fisher’s suggested 
changes. 
The continuing role of copyright in America is more predictable, at least in general terms. 
It is unlikely that legislation will be passed that curtails existing statutory protections or 
decreases copyright terms. If anything, history shows that these elements will only increase, with 
the resulting feedback loop creating a greater sense of copyright as entitlement or a natural right, 
rather than a statutory right with the original inte tion of temporarily incentivizing authors with 
the right to exclusively copy their works for financial gain.  
Another factor that must be considered is the continued advance of technology, which 
will continue to undermine copyright’s promise of exclusivity in distribution. Writing about 
copyright in 1962, Lyman Ray Patterson wrote, “Technology outpaced the law.”49 That 
statement is even more relevant in today’s world, where instant authorship and digital copying 
and distribution of almost any possible intellectual expression is the norm. 
There is no doubt that the Internet provides an effici nt platform for the instantaneous 
worldwide publication of an intellectual work. As the architecture of the Internet exists today, 
there is no distinction made between whether information that is shared is subject to copyright or 
not. But that may not always be the case, and future research should consider what the 
implications are for changes in the law that will impede the Internet’s ability to share all 
information without prejudice, or to impose stricter punishments for those who promote the free 
flow of information without regard to copyright. As Lawrence Lessig states, “The law's role is 
less and less to support creativity, and more and more to protect certain industries against 
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competition.”50 But protecting against competition creates the very problem that copyright was 
originally meant to eliminate: the danger of a permanent monopoly on information by limited 
proprietary interests. This is how changes made to copyright law may ultimately disregard the  
original purpose of copyright, and the next chapter explains what the potential normative future 
of copyright might be. 
 
Chapter 2  
Normative Futures and Public Domains Access 
The ability to instantaneously distribute information or ideas without restricting access to 
the same at their point of origin is one of the great gifts of technology and the Internet in 
particular. But the notion behind that technology is not itself new. In a letter to Isaac McPherson 
from 1813, Thomas Jefferson stated, “He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction 
himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without 
darkening me.”51 Short of competing for profits with the original author of a fixed intellectual 
work, then, no law on copyright should infringe on an individual’s ability to use or access a 
copyrighted work in any way he or she may see fit. This was the intention of the Constitutional 
Framers in drafting a copyright clause, and it is what should continue to motivate legislators and 
the courts in determining what is the appropriate scope, duration, and control of copyrights in 
America today. 
The changing nature of America’s economy over the past several decades serves as one 
reason for the continuing changes to copyright law in that same time span. As economic scholars 
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have shown, in the past half a century the United States has shifted its economic focus from 
service industries to information and cultural industries.52 The development and widespread 
adoption of the Internet has aided in this paradigm shift, which is felt in information economies 
such as the financial sector and software development, and in the cultural economies of music, 
film, and literature. As Yochai Benkler states in hs book The Wealth of Networks, “The basic 
output that has become dominant in the most advanced e onomies is human meaning and 
communication.”53 Benkler also notes that the Internet could serve as a networked public sphere, 
with the potential for all human artistic and informational expression freely available to anyone 
that can access the network. No further changes to the Internet’s architecture are necessary for it 
to exist as a complete cultural commons, although explicitly positioning it as such undermines 
existing legal doctrines of copyright and intellectual property. However, the rights of humans to 
freely access this cultural commons should be more important than the economic interests of a 
handful of managed firms that traffic in copyrighted information. Therefore, the rule of law must 
be used to protect the advantages granted by the Internet’s open architecture, rather than used to 
cripple that architecture for proprietary interests.  
This is not to say that the government should no loger grant the limited monopoly of 
copyrights, but there should be a balance between rward and entitlement closer to the original 
length of 14 years, rather than the current length of close to a century. And after a copyright 
expires, creative works and copyrights should enter th  public domain, a concept that was 
created as an outcome of England’s case of Donaldson v. Beckett in 1774, wherein legal control 
of creative works by a particular party (in short, a monopoly) expires and culture passes into 
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what Lawrence Lessig refers to as a “competitive context, not a context in which the choices 
about what culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made by the few 
despite the wishes of the many.”54 Diversity in choice provided by the Internet is beneficial for 
society, as it provides consumers with the opportunity to choose content actively rather than 
accept limited offerings by distribution channels such as an FM radio station, movie chain rental 
store like Blockbuster, or Barnes & Noble. In this way, a healthy public domain encourages 
cultural diversity, which John Stuart Mill observed in On Liberty as having cumulative effects: 
the more choices individuals have, the more they must personally decide what to think, 
developing what he called “mental and moral faculties.”55 
The idea of the public domain has always been present in the United States of America, 
with the Constitution drawing a distinction between actual property and intellectual (creative) 
property. For actual property, the Fifth Amendment includes a “Takings Clause” that requires the 
government to pay “just compensation” for the privilege of taking someone’s property. On the 
other hand, the Constitution requires that creative property must be released into the public 
domain after a “limited time” (again, the original statutory provision was 14 years), with no 
compensation for what a copyright holder might perceive as a taking of personal property. But 
increasing copyright term limits, as well as the high burden of entry into illegal publication for 
those who would flaunt copyright, has kept copyright holders satisfied despite the distinction 
between how the government treats these two kinds of property. However, the Internet and 
digital technologies have since minimized or outright removed many of the architectural burdens 
on publication and redistribution, to the point where a digital copy might be an actual tangible 
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property, but its physical presence is so miniscule and so easily copied that it is rarely thought of 
as a real object or subject to limitations on duplication. 
Before the advent of digital distribution, audiences had to rely primarily on the physical 
redistribution of used books if they wanted to read a work that was out of print and therefore 
difficult to access. Books tend to go out of print very quickly, most within the space of a year, 
and of books published between 1927 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print at the turn of the 
21st century.56 Although not a perfect system, one of the ways that books are guaranteed a 
second life even when out of print is the first sale doctrine. The first sale doctrine is a result of 
the Supreme Court case Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus (210 U.S. 339 (1908)), wherein the court 
decided that “[O]ne who has sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all 
right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the 
copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of it.” (id at 350). At 
least for printed works, then, this doctrine aids in the spread of culture and access to creative 
works, and the limited monopoly of copyright does not grant the owner absolute control over 
pricing and dissemination of a work.57 
Laws such as the first sale doctrine apply only to physical goods, which are not easily 
copied, and not to digital works, which are easily duplicated, but perhaps not legally so.58 Today, 
digital duplication could easily supplant the first sale doctrine as a way to keep all culture and 
creative expression constantly “in print,” but copyright owners have legitimate concerns about 
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what this perpetual second life would do to the market for creative works. As Brewster Kahle, 
creator of the Internet Archive (archive.org) states, here are about 26 million known different 
titles of books, 3 million recordings of music, and close to 2 million movies that have ever been 
released. And as large as those numbers are, it is the belief of Kahle that “universal access to all 
knowledge is within our grasp,” and everything ever meant for distribution could be made 
available to anyone in the world (with Internet access).59 This is the ideal of the cultural 
commons, a universal database free to use and transfo m in ways that serve the public good. But 
this universal access would have to come at the price of changes in copyright laws that are 
opposed by owners benefiting from the current system. 
The punitive measures imposed for breaking copyright laws afford copyright owners 
extreme measures of control in ensuring the continua on of the current system. Those who 
dissent face potentially tragic consequences. A recent example is the case of Aaron Swartz, who 
was partially responsible for the creations of RSS, Creative Commons, and was the cofounder of 
Demand Progress, a technology policy activist group. Swartz committed suicide in January, 
2013, while facing charges that could have resulted in 35 years in jail and a $1 million fine for 
“allegedly hacking into a Massachusetts Institute of Technology network and downloading 
millions of scholarly articles from the JSTOR subscription service.”60 Swartz wanted to make the 
articles available free of charge as an act of nonviolent protest against current copyright laws.  
“New technology, instead of bringing us greater freedom, would have snuffed out 
fundamental rights we'd always taken for granted," Swartz said in a 2012 condemnation of the 
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Stop Online Piracy Act,61 and this quote sums up the 26 year-old’s stance on inf rmation’s role 
in society: it should be free and made readily avail ble to all who want access to it.  
Swartz was prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which does not 
differentiate between malicious crimes committed for profit and the liberation of information 
into the public sphere, according to Chris Soghoian, a technologist and policy analyst with the 
American Civil Liberties Union's speech, privacy and technology project.62 Swartz’s case was 
the most prominent recent example of broadly-defined laws being used to protect the copyrights 
of moneyed interests at the expense of the public dissemination of information. 
Before digital technologies made such public dissemination as simple as cut and paste, 
court decisions favored the public’s ability to literally cut and paste fixed creative works as a 
way to disseminate information. In a case that came before Bobbs-Merrill, that of Harrison v. 
Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894), the court determined that the owner of a 
particular copy had the “right to repair” and sell damaged books, which required duplicating 
damaged portions to make the work complete again.  
Similarly, in Kipling v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 120 F. 631 (2d Cir. 1903), the court decided 
that owners of a copy of a work could rebind and combine books into new anthologies and sell 
those copies. These cases all indicate that the most i portant aspect to the court was not the 
mechanical act of reproduction, but what would happen to the market. If the number of copies 
hasn’t increased, according to these rulings, then re is no harm to the copyright holder. 
From this, Sherwin Siy, the VP for legal affairs for the Public Knowledge group, 
proposes the hypothetical device of a fax-shredder that would create a telecommunicated copy of 
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a document as it destroys the original fed into the machine.63 This device could potentially bring 
the publishing platform of the Internet and digital distribution back to a system similar to the one 
of paper printing and distribution, but this again represents an artificial limitation on what 
technology is capable of doing in regards to access. It is an interesting thought experiment, but 
ultimately misguided to create technologies that seek to enforce outdated laws, rather than 
modifying the laws to support the potential of technology for sharing and access. 
 
A Generative System 
In direct opposition to the potential artificial monopoly of current technology to match 
outmoded publishing platforms is a completely open architecture that would allow for a 
universal cultural commons. The open architecture of the Internet and personal computers are, in 
the words of Harvard Internet Law professor Jonathan Zittrain, “solutions waiting for problems,” 
with no embedded functionality.64 They are completely open and initially unregulated pieces of 
technology. In short, they are g nerative, a word Zittrain uses to describe what he views as a
combination of adaptability and accessibility, the most important qualities of the Internet as 
originally designed. In Zittrain’s book The Future of the Internet, he compares examples of 
generative technology with appliancized technology, devices and systems that are meant to be 
used in a predetermined way that cannot be easily changed by the end user. Zittrain states that 
“the more useful a technology is both to the neophyte and to the expert, the more generative it 
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is,” with his primary example being the pencil, whic  is easy to master but difficult to leverage 
into an artistic career.65 
Other factors contributing to something’s generativity are adaptability, accessibility, and 
transferability, but all of these factors also contribute to the double-edged sword of generativity, 
in that the systems it helps to create challenge and ultimately threaten existing systems that enjoy 
legal protection, such as owners of copyrighted works which are easily duplicated using 
generative PCs. Technology companies that were initially in the business of manufacturing and 
selling generative devices have changed their busines  model to create appliancized devices that 
allow for more economic growth, as is the case with Apple. Today, the iPhone is an appliancized 
device that does not allow the free movement of digital files through the system, nor can just 
anyone develop and install third-party software on it. This is in stark contrast to the company’s 
line of personal computers dating back to the Apple II, which allowed innovation and free 
movement of personal files by any end user.66 The focus on creating appliancized devices 
endangers the right of access to intellectual and creative works by end users, which ultimately 
threatens the advancement of the cultural commons. 
In much the same way as the terms are used for machines, generative networks foster 
innovation and disruption from all corners, while an appliancized network incorporates powerful 
existing features but regulates to the point that future surprise innovations are improbable, if not 
impossible. The Internet, with its lack of centralized global control, is a perfect example of a 
generative network, and that is the type of system that benefits everyone. 
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“Generative systems are powerful and valuable, not o ly because they foster the 
production of useful things like browsers, auction sites, and free encyclopedias, but also because 
they can allow an extraordinary number of people to xpress themselves in speech, art, or code 
and to work with other people in ways previously not p ssible,” states Zittrain.67 Therefore, 
generative systems work as cultural enhancers that u ilize a society’s cognitive surplus in 
meaningful ways. Generative systems and the users who participate in them constantly refine and 
add value and novelty to the system, so that participation is creative and contributory, and not 
merely consumptive. 
In addition, appliancized devices hurt not only the advancement of the cultural commons, 
but they also infringe on the property rights of individuals when new copyright regulations grant 
corporations proprietary interest in the objects they sell even after they are sold. In downloading 
many programs and files legally today, users often must agree to the End User License 
Agreement (EULA), which states “This software is licensed to you, not sold.” However, U.S. 
copyright statute 109 prohibits renting software, even though in the case of Vernor v. Autodesk, 
Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010), a man was heldliable by the court for reselling software that 
he himself had bought second-hand and never installed on his own computer, so he had never 
even agreed to the EULA. What the courts have essentially empowered software companies to 
do is determine what is the legal use of software “lic nsed” to a user, so not only is there no right 
of first sale, but the interaction of the user with the software is subject to copyright infringement 
even if there is no duplication of the work in question.  
When software companies sue a user for what they determine is not a normal use, the 
abnormal use might really be a result of the essential step defense, which is just the court’s way 
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of saying it is okay for a computer to make copies of a program or file automatically for the 
necessity of viewing that file (17 U.S.C. § 117). After all, it is difficult to create a digital 
recording in such a way as to make it impossible to copy or redistribute, since the recording must 
at some point “generate an unencrypted stream of data th t can be interpreted by a sound system 
or screen.”68 Again, this demonstrates the difficulty with treating digital files as real property, 
since the architecture of a personal computer automatically duplicates that property as a 
necessary step for access. Copyright owners such as software companies are then able to abuse 
this fact to seek an injunction if they are upset with how a user interacts with their software.69 
This was demonstrated in the case of George Hotz, an American hacker known for unlocking the 
iPhone and allowing it to be used with any wireless carrier. When Hotz similarly gained root 
access to his Sony Playstation 3 video game system and published the results, Sony sued him for 
breach of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which 
have such broad language as to prevent a user from gaining unauthorized access to devices they 
have purchased.70 The DMCA is ostensibly meant to protect copyrights, and in fact doubled the 
length of the federal copyright statute, but it was also a partially reworked piece of legislation 
meant to control access.71 The DMCA thus allowed for an individual to be prosecuted for 
attempting to circumvent any access control on a piece of technology, independent of whether 
the technology controls access to copyrighted materials. In short, Hotz was found in violation of 
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contributory copyright infringement for modifying the property he owned, even though he did 
not unlawfully duplicate copyrighted materials. 
The ultimate result of creating and enforcing copyright laws that limit the actions of the 
individual in regards to manipulation of property, then, is to regulate the individual and censor 
both artistic and economic expression. For the benefit of empowering individuals and society to 
create better innovations and means of communication, laws like the DMCA and CFAA should 
be abolished to make way for an open public sphere made possible by generative systems.  
A generative system is never complete, but it is possible to interrupt it, usually as a result 
of increased regulation, which occurs as a means of legally protecting interests that are 
challenged by generative systems. As Benkler writes, “Information, knowledge, and culture are 
central to human freedom and development,” but these elements of the cultural commons are not 
so relevant to organizations whose primary concern is economic growth.72 Instead, these 
organizations favor sustaining innovations over disruptive innovations. 
Sustaining innovations to technologies and markets do what is already being done, but 
better, while “disruptive” innovations offer advantges only to emerging markets. Since this is 
not the demand of mainstream consumers, and thus not financially dominant, industries are not 
quick to adopt disruptive innovations, nor show “downward vision and mobility,” according to 
Clayton Christensen, author of The Innovator’s Dilemma.73 Again, Apple’s appliancized devices 
(such as the iPod and iPhone) are a good example. The initial development of and widespread 
adoption of mp3s as the popular form for listening to music, enabled by the ubiquitous file-
sharing program Napster, was a disruptive innovation to the music business in the late 90s and 
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early 2000s, but Apple’s development of devices that could access a proprietary music retailer, 
iTunes, was a sustaining innovation. While users are able to connect iPods to PCs and transfer 
their own files to the device, iPods themselves can only directly access music files acquired 
through iTunes. Zittrain’s warning on the subject is clear: “People do not buy PCs as insurance 
policies against appliances that limit their freedoms, even though PCs serve exactly this vital 
function.”74 
Copyright holders aligned with organizations like th  RIAA and MPAA would prefer 
legal interpretations that regarded any digital transfer of a file as reproduction and not 
distribution. This would put a halt to the legal sale of any used media, and force every user to 
purchase digital media from the initial copyright holder. But increasingly, consumers don’t 
purchase copies, they purchase access. So should users have the right to trade or sell this access 
to one another? Extrapolating from this idea of complete economic control of a creative work by 
a copyright holder, Siy notes, “We can imagine a system where you can pay one amount to read 
a book, another to have the ability to flip back a few pages, another amount to search the text, 
another amount to be able to cut and paste from it, and so on. Such a system seems at best 
tedious and at worst dystopian, but it’s within therealm of technological possibility.”75 That sort 
of extreme hypothetical situation echoes what author Chuck Klosterman refers to as a 
technocratic police state, which he suggests people would be unable to resist if restrictive 
technology is the only available technology. “We’ve ceded control to the machines. The upside 
is that the machines still have masters. The downside i  that we don’t usually like who those 
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masters are.”76 And while Klosterman’s role as a cultural essayist draws a more populist crowd 
than the academics who write about copyright, there are similarities in the theories about overly-
broad copyright protections and what those mean for access of creative works. 
The undermining of the first sale doctrine through technology and license agreements not 
only impedes access to creative works, it also emphasizes how creative property is distinct from 
property. With real property, one has ownership of a particular object, like a house, but not 
ownership of every recurring instance of a house.  In copyright law, a "work" is the creative 
thing that the author made, and a "copy" of a work is a physical material object that embodies the 
copyrighted work, whether that is paper, CD, or the digital code defining a particular instance of 
a work. But with digital code, the physical object itself is so negligible, and the ability to 
duplicate it so easy, that many people view creating additional copies as a moral right, even if the 
law does not allow it. This is supported by polls of United States citizens cited by economist 
William Fisher, showing that between 40 and 56 percent of respondents believe file sharing of 
copyrighted materials is not immoral and that eventually the law would reflect that.77 
So, on one side of the debate about copyright are corporate structures that seek greater 
legal protections against what they see as the threat of communication technologies which allow 
potentially unrestricted access to information and creative property. Those opposed to that theory 
include activists (such as Swartz) who believe thate rights of humanity to access information 
are instead threatened by draconian copyright laws. Either way, most forms of creative 
expression are now infinitely shareable goods thanks to the ability to digitally duplicate 
information at low-to-no cost. These infinitely share ble goods are, in the words of Yochai 
Benkler, nonrival resources that are not endangered, and are in fact emboldened, by social 
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sharing. However, information that is positioned as a nonrival cultural resource is also, 
consequently, a nonrival economic good. As Benkler states, from the point of view of society, 
enforcing copyrights leads to “inefficient underutilization of copyrighted information.”78 
However, one of the supporting arguments for copyright law that has existed since at least the 
framing of the United States Constitution is that authors might not contribute to the public sphere 
of knowledge if their natural rights are not protected. So a balance must be struck between 
protection for authors and the public’s right to freely access information, and in legal settings this 
balance has traditionally been the domain of fair use. 
 
Fair Use 
The creation of increasingly broad protections for c pyright may incentivize authors to 
contribute to the public sphere of knowledge, but cer ain protections also stifle creativity and 
artificially limit that same public sphere. This is the case with derivative rights, which grant 
copyright owners a monopoly not just on their own works, but also on works deemed to be 
transformations of the original work. With these protections, an author is assured that someone 
trying to adapt their book into a movie, for example, must seek that original author’s permission 
before doing so. Which at one end of the spectrum seem  fair, but at the other end, derivative 
rights threaten even the notion of quoting passages from one book in a new one by defining all 
such “cutting and pasting” as transformative of the first book, and therefore subject to regulation 
and possible injunction. This leaves open the interpretation of contemporary copyright as a 
system that can be abused to limit or otherwise regulate free speech, since it could be seen as an 
infringement of copyright to even respond to an original work. 
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Those who argue against the possibility of such a totali arian interpretation of copyright 
regulations might point to fair use as a safe harbor for what are currently understood as 
unregulated uses of a fixed creative work, such as re ding or reselling in the case of a physical 
book. Others could point to the legal maxim “De mini is non curat lex,” which roughly means 
“the law doesn’t care about little things,” as a supposed driving force for how the law will choose 
to deal with copying or quoting an insignificant amount of a work protected by copyright. But 
with the Internet, where every use of any copyrighted work automatically produces a copy, 
access is no longer “de minimis,” and what were previously unregulated actions such as reading 
or sharing are subject to regulatory restrictions. This is where fair use comes into play, but as 
Lessig states, “Before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of copyright law...The 
right to read was effectively protected before because reading was not regulated.”79 The increase 
of regulations to keep up with technology puts a greater burden on the defense of fair use for 
what should remain unregulated activities. And copyright protections for things like software and 
ebooks (as opposed to physical books) assume that any use of them is transformative because a 
copy is made, and therefore subject to regulation.  
These increased regulations for digital media in tur lead to the creation and enforcement 
of penalties for their infringement. For example, the RIAA successfully lobbied the Tennessee 
legislature in 2011 to make it illegal for users to willingly share their passwords with each other 
for streaming entertainment services like Netflix and Rhapsody, with infringements that can lead 
to felony charges and jail time.80 Again, the initial intent of copyright as a limited monopoly to 
sell a fixed work is subverted to allow copyright owners powers of coercion in determining how 
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intellectual property is accessed. Rick Falkvinge, an advocate for changes in information policy, 
also makes note that the law is not too far removed from the dystopic short story “The Right to 
Read,” by Richard Stallman, about a University student who cannot afford the reading license 
that is mandated by the state as necessary to pick u  a book.81  
The difference between Stallman’s story and Tennessee’  password law is that while 
reading a physical book remains an unregulated activity, accessing (and thus creating a copy of) 
digital information is increasingly regulated. So the scope of control that a copyright owner has 
increases, and rights for the consumer such as the first-sale doctrine continue to fall by the 
wayside. This makes regulation of access the de facto norm, and increases the strain on fair use 
as a defense for what should be unregulated activities. This is a problem, but it might be a 
problem that could be kept in relative check if human agents were always in charge of 
determining what is or is not fair use. However, as Le sig states, rules of copyright law are 
increasingly built into the architecture of delivery systems for copyrighted content, so that code, 
devoid of the ability to determine nuance for fair use, can unfairly or inaccurately restrict 
access.82 Lessig’s example for this is the permissions function on devices like Adobe’s ebook 
reader, which allows only a certain amount of copies to be printed or digital duplicated, and so 
should more accurately be called controls rather than permissions. For a new e-book purchased 
on the device, these limitations on permissions are justified and within the rights of the copyright 
owner, but the same limitations are automatically placed on works in the public domain. Further, 
methods of encryption do not dissolve when a copyrighted work passes into the public domain, 
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so the duration of entitlement ensured by encryption is indefinite.83 The problem is that the 
default setting for access to content is one of limitations and controls, instead of defaulting to 
open access unless information is proven to be under copyright. 
Despite the systems for control programmed into the code of appliancized devices like 
the Adobe ebook reader, the code itself is not absolute. It is still possible for human programmers 
to hack software, essentially enabling programs to do what they were not initially intended to do, 
such as allow infinite copying of an e-book. So while code may be a stopgap measure for 
staunching the flow of information, in many situations hackers have proved that code may be 
circumvented, and that if anyone has the power to copy and disseminate intellectual property in a 
digital format, ultimate control of digital copies does not exist. Nor should it, as the ethos of 
generative systems holds. What is good for individuals and the expansion of the cultural 
commons is good for the collective of humanity, butno  necessarily good for existing copyright 
owners. Thus, copyright owners have petitioned the government for increased legal protection, in 
the form of laws such as the DMCA, when code fails s an effective means of control.  
As Lessig describes the DMCA, this specific law is “ legal code intended to buttress 
software code which itself was intended to support the legal code of copyright.”84 But in a 
curious twist, it does this not by regulating copyrighted works themselves, instead regulating the 
devices that are used to hack code that regulate copyrighted works. This is how George Hotz was 
prosecuted for hacking his iPhone and Playstation 3. Hotz may have been able to defend as fair 
use his hacking of these devices under copyright law, but when he breached the DMCA, he was 
charged with circumventing copyright protection systems, not copyright itself. In another case, 
Princeton academic Ed Felten of Princeton led a group of computer scientists in removing the 
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digital watermarks placed on music by the RIAA in the form of SDMI (Secure Digital Music 
Initiative), but renounced the $10,000 reward offered by the RIAA so he could instead publish 
the results. The RIAA threatened legal action under th  DMCA, but Felten’s own declaratory 
judgment suit alleged that such action would violate the First Amendment. The RIAA then 
issued a statement that it was alright to publish the results. Fortunately, at least in this case, the 
U.S. Department of Justice has assured researchers like Felten that the DMCA may not be used 
to limit free speech in this way, although future interpretations of the law might not be so lenient 
to the free speech of academic researchers.85 
Copyright owners empowered by the increased scope of copyright law have even less 
reason to show leniency to copyright infringements on the Internet, coupled with a greater ability 
to detect those same infringements. Since networked personal computers create copies of 
everything as an essential step of running software, ev ry action the user makes is subject to 
regulation. So, a curious dichotomy arises: personal computers serve a vital function of allowing 
unrestricted access to the generative system that is the Internet. But at the same time, activities 
that were unregulated when performed offline are now p tential breaches of copyright when 
enacted online. “Misuse is easier to find and easier to control,” states Lessig.86 Again, the 
original intent of copyright was only to grant a limited monopoly for a brief period of time, but 
today its scope and duration has ballooned to the point where the monopoly is no longer limited, 
and ownership of a copyright extends to derivative int rpretations of a fixed work.  
For those who own copyrights, then, there is the possibility of unprecedented control over 
innovation and creativity for society as a whole, and this is exacerbated by the concentration of 
the media into fewer and fewer distinct entities. A Senator John McCain stated in 2003, “five 
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companies control 85 percent of our media sources,”87 a result of deregulation of media 
ownership in the early 1990s. Theoretically, this integration could still result in meaningful 
creation of intellectual works, albeit under the ownership of an elite few. But in all likelihood, 
this integration affects creativity in a negative manner, as large media conglomerates attempt to 
repurpose existing intellectual properties rather tan foster new or innovative ones. Again, this is 
the lesson from Christensen’s The Innovator’s Dilemma, where large traditional firms find it 
rational to ignore disruptive technologies that compete with their core business. These large 
firms find it more profitable to produce sustaining i novations or creative works that do not 
venture too far outside of what is already being produced. It is then left to independent agents to 
produce truly disruptive and innovative creative works, but this is increasingly difficult to do in a 
media landscape with such a small amount of true competition, and where every action of 
creativity or media interaction is subject to regulation. 
Independent agents who want to create outside of traditional firms and publishing houses 
do have the option to potentially reach a mass audience by using online service providers like 
YouTube and Amazon, but this option comes with its own set of problems. Amazon’s 
CreateSpace ebook publishing service allows authors o quickly bring their books to the 
marketplace, but claims of trademark or copyright infringement, even false ones, will result in 
Amazon just as quickly removing those books from the service. This was the case with M.C.A. 
Hogarth, a woman who wrote an ebook, Spots the Space Marine, which Amazon took down after 
the U.K. company Games Workshop claimed to have a trademark right to the term “space 
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marine.”88 In fact, this trademark was registered to prevent competition in the games 
marketplace, but Games Workshop believed that its expansion into ebooks about its own space 
marine characters expanded proprietary interest in the term to literature. This is even more 
disturbing when one considers that the term “space marine” has been used in science-fiction 
since at least 1932, with the Amazing Stories tale “Captain Brink of the Space Marines.”89 It was 
only through the help of the Electronic Frontier Foundation that Hogarth was able to convince 
employees at Amazon that the trademark infringement claim was bogus and have her book 
reinstated. 
The larger issue at play is that although creators d  have more platforms today for 
distributing creative and intellectual work, these platforms are compromised by laws that favor 
increased regulation of creative content and presum that independent creators are infringing on 
the proprietary rights of existing firms. Therefore, even the most liberal service providers would 
prefer to remain neutral in disputes of ownership, and will defer to removing offending content at 
the first sign of a cease and desist letter. Again, this is an even bigger problem when coupled 
with the fact that there are less and less large media conglomerates for an author to solicit on the 
path to traditional publication, and without competition between many firms, innovation suffers 
as corporations choose to play it safe. 
For the good of the public at large and the continuation of cultural innovation through 
creativity, it is necessary for copyright owners and corporations to change and adapt to the open 
structure of the Internet, not to seek regulation that continues to protect their proprietary 
interests. These proprietary interests should not be abandoned entirely, but they must be balanced 
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with citizens’ rights to access creative and intellectual works. Further, proprietary interests 
defined by law should consider just what kinds of pr perty are being protected. 
 
Protecting the Public Domain 
Zechariah Chafee stated in a lecture on copyright from 1945 that objections to intellectual 
property indicate a general distaste for private prope ty, but he also acknowledged that 
differences among types of property should result in differences in their treatment by law. 
Building from that, David Lange noted in 1981 that the expanding scope of intellectual property 
interests through changes in copyright law should be offset by a purposeful expansion of 
individual rights in the public domain.90 Whether this is a job best suited for private 
organizations or the government is up for debate, but legal realists have stated that any property 
rights must be created in a way that balances public and private interests. To this effect, several 
organizations, both public and private, are currently engaged in contributing to an open universal 
generative network and cultural commons. Among these are Google with its controversial 
Google Books scanning project, and the partnership of major research institutions that contribute 
to the non-profit HathiTrust project. 
But it has not been strictly the purview of organizations to expand the cultural commons 
and ensure that the culture of the past is available to the citizens of today. Private agents, acting 
without commercial interest, have used the low-cost publishing platform of the Internet to 
distribute public domain works. One such agent is Er c ldred, a retired computer programmer 
who, in 1995, uploaded the works of Nathaniel Hawthorne to a server, in an example of what 
                                               




Lessig calls a “noncommercial publication of public domain works.”91 Eldred even added 
annotations and contextual images, so that his contribution to the public domain was 
transformative of the original works. He enjoyed the project, and continued adding other authors 
to his online archive, until his planned addition of R bert Frost’s collection of poems New 
Hampshire was inhibited by Congress’ decision in 1998 to expand the duration of copyright 
again through the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. 
The example of Eric Eldred and his efforts to enrich the public domain points to the harm 
that is caused by unrestricted extensions of copyright. While certain copyrights, such as those 
held by the estate of Robert Frost, may continue to be profitable to their owners, the vast 
majority hold no commercial value, and are therefor much more likely to disappear from the 
public consciousness entirely. It is only within the safety of the public domain that those works 
would ever be able to find a meaningful second life as noncommercial publications uploaded and 
shared by concerned citizens. 
Research by Paul J. Heald at the University of Illinois emphasizes the loss to the cultural 
commons caused by excessive copyright terms. Heald use a webscript to crawl the online 
bookseller Amazon, showing that there were as many newly-published books available from the 
1910s as there were from the 2000s, and that the number of newly-published books from the 
1850s (close to 80) was twice that of books from the 1950s (under 40). As Heald puts it, 
“Copyright correlates significantly with the disappearance of works rather than with their 
availability. Shortly after works are created and proprietized, they tend to disappear from public 
view only to reappear in significantly increased numbers when they fall into the public domain 
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and lose their owners.”92 Heald’s research also suggests that the commercial lifespan for most 
creative works is brief, so that publishers are deterr d from releasing books again until they are 
in the public domain. 
So if publishers do not reissue books that are not currently in the public domain, and 
copyright terms continue to be extended indefinitely, what happens to intellectual and creative 
works without commercial value from 1923 onwards? If no one digitizes or otherwise copies 
those works, it is possible that existing copies will rot away. This fate is an even greater threat 
for film on nitrate-based stock, which, if not transferred to safety stock, will gradually dissolve 
over time. And this would mean the loss of basically ny film produced before 1952. 
Part of the problem with current copyright laws is that copyrights are granted 
automatically and remain in effect by default for close to a century. As Lessig states, the 
consequence of this is that we live in a “permission s ciety” for accessing creative works.93 It is 
necessary to identify the owner and gain permission to build upon his or her work, a task that is 
made unnecessarily difficult by having no central copyright registry. Copyright has expanded in 
scope to such a degree that it is also necessary and prudent to weaken the regulation of copyright 
in order to strengthen cultural creativity. “Never has copyright protected such a wide range of 
rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a te m hat was remotely as long,” as Lessig 
states.94 
Eldred, with the help of Lessig and the law firm of J nes, Day, Reavis and Pogue, 
attempted to bring those sweeping rights back into balance with the public domain by filing a 
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lawsuit in 1999. This suit asked the federal district court in Washington, D.C., to declare the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional, under the claims that extending 
existing terms violated the Constitution’s “limited times” requirement, and that extending terms 
by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.95 Lessig and company lost the case, 
partly as a result of how representatives of certain popular copyrighted works frame the 
argument of legal proprietary interest in intellectual works as a form of moral guardianship. 
Representatives for the estate of Dr. Seuss, for example, argue that if that author’s works 
were in the public domain, transformative works of st ries such as “The Cat in the Hat” could be 
used to “glorify drugs or to create pornography.”96 Meanwhile, the estate of George Gershwin 
argues that it should continue to have a monopoly on the rights to the play “Porgy and Bess” 
because it has the moral duty to refuse to license it to anyone who does not cast African-
Americans in the roles. Implicit in both of these arguments is the idea that the public is not to be 
trusted with certain intellectual property, which should remain under exclusive control in 
perpetuity. Lessig describes this assumption as a re ult of the blind acceptance of the idea of 
property in American culture. “[W]e don't even question when the control of that property 
removes our ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically.”97 While a copyright is in 
effect, its owner has an economic monopoly on that intellectual work, but that monopoly should 
not last forever, and it should not impede radical interpretations or derivations of the original 
work anyway (even interpretations dealing with potentially sensitive issues like drugs and race), 
as such limitations clearly violate the freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment. 
Another argument against the CTEA is the extension of copyrights ostensibly seeks to 
rectify problems of the past that are no longer possible to fix. The stated purpose of copyright in 
                                               
95 Lessig (2006), p. 164 
96 Lessig (2006), p. 166 
97 Lessig (2006), p. 187 
47 
 
the Constitution is to “promote the progress of scien e and the useful arts,” but the effect of that 
promotion can only be considered in the present. No am unt of copyright extension will further 
promote science and art in the year 1923. If Congress wants to increase the term of copyright, 
then, it only makes sense to make a new term of copyright applicable to present and future 
intellectual works, not those from the past. As Lessig tates, “No matter what we do today, we 
will not increase the number of authors who wrote in 1923.”98 So if that is the case, then why do 
corporate interests continue to lobby for extensions f copyright? 
Corporations and other owners of profitable copyrights are not strictly motivated by the 
desire to protect their content. Instead, copyright term extensions are a way to assure that nothing 
else enters the public domain, which, for owners of copyrighted material, potentially serves as 
just another source of competition for audience attntion. But the public domain is even more 
dangerous than another commercial competitor, becaus  it has no commercial interests of its 
own. And since commercial and noncommercial material sh re the common delivery system that 
is the Internet, a strong public domain has a distinct advantage over copyrighted content that 
requires additional permissions to access, distribute, and transform works. For that reason, many 
corporate owners of valuable copyrights would prefer that no other intellectual works ever enter 
the public domain, with 1923 as the current bulwark. “As a good Republican might say, here 
government regulation is simply getting in the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good 
Democrat might say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no 
good reason,” writes Lessig, describing the importance of changing copyright’s strictures in a 
political context.99 
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It is also important to note that works in the public domain are not valueless, and there 
are organizations which still profit from them. The difference between works in the public 
domain and those under copyright is only that there is no monopoly on who is able to legally 
profit from their distribution. As described earlie n this thesis, there is no copyright on the 
opinions of the Supreme Court, and anyone can freely access them through a library. However, 
Lexis and Westlaw also have electronic versions of case reports available to their service 
subscribers, and they can charge users for the privilege of gaining access to court opinions. This 
is one example of how a free market decides what the value of content is without the burden of 
excessive regulation and interminable monopolies. 
 
Conclusions 
 As this thesis has shown, governments, private interes  groups, authors, and 
representatives of the public have engaged in arguments about the proper role and 
implementation of copyright for hundreds of years, nd it does not seem as though the debate 
will subside any time soon. Ever since the invention of the printing press made the 
technologically-assisted transmission of information an enterprise ripe for profit, these parties 
have argued about just who should reap that profit. Beginning with the Statute of Anne, 
copyright legislation has typically been enacted as a means of suppressing monopolistic practices 
regarding information while still incentivizing authors to add to the public sphere of knowledge. 
In America, the founding fathers made explicit in the Constitution the notion that copyright was 
meant primarily to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts,” and subsequent 
iterations of copyright law express the same goals.  
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But while the ostensible goals of copyright have remained the same, changes in 
technology continue to necessitate changes in copyright legislation, as new forms of expression 
such as film and sound recordings enter the marketplace alongside the maps, charts, and books 
that were the initial recipients of U.S. copyright protections. In addition, advances in technology 
having to do with digital reproduction and the communication standards made possible by the 
Internet simultaneously create potential for generativity and disruption. The generative power of 
the Internet benefits the learning capabilities of end users who engage with copyrighted material, 
but at the same time disrupts traditional distribution models and potentially endangers the market 
advantage previously enjoyed by copyright owners. For this reason, corporations that own 
valuable copyrights want to staunch this disruption with greater regulation of how audiences 
interact with creative works, including legal sanctions for activities that were previously 
unregulated, such as the mere act of reading.  
A realistic assessment of the current legal landscape must grant that existing power 
structures will continue to petition Congress for increased proprietary control of creative works, 
and receive it. Corporations will also continue to develop new appliancized devices that strictly 
regulate access to content, coupled with legislation like the DMCA that prevents the 
manipulation of these devices to allow greater access by the user. The irony, then, is that these 
corporate interests want to infringe on the property rights of individuals who own these devices 
for the sake of enforcing supposed property rights in he intangible ideas that are communicated 
through these devices. And if appliancized devices that strictly regulate access become the 
standard, and there is every reasons to suspect that they might, then concepts such as fair use will 
fall by the wayside as software code is increasingly expected to determine what is or is not a 
legal means of access to information. 
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The disruption of traditional distribution models by digital technologies has not only 
stretched the fair use doctrine to the point of breaking, but these technologies have also confused 
the notion of owning an iteration of a work versus owning the copyright in that work, impeding 
previous users rights such as the first sale doctrine. Some individuals and organizations view 
their ownership of a copyright as a natural right that extends to control over just how every 
iteration of a work is used or accessed. However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that 
Congress’ grant of a copyright is a privilege that c rries with it an obligation to society to 
promote learning. Therefore, copyright owners should be prepared to enjoy the benefits of a 
temporary economic monopoly only if they also realize that it is impossible to simultaneously 
hold a cultural monopoly where only those who seek p rmission to engage in regulated versions 
of activities like reading may gain access to information. 
Instead, a free market for creative and intellectual works should be the default setting for 
the effective spread of culture. In order to continue to “promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts,” monopolies should be granted to authors of new works. However, these monopolies, 
called copyrights, should be temporary and not subject to automatic unlimited extension. This is 
in line with the founders’ intentions for copyright, and is the most effective way to encourage 
public benefit from the dissemination of intellectual and creative expression, which is the 
primary purpose of such monopolies. If, instead, there are excessive rewards granted by 
copyright monopolies, such as monopolies that can extend up to four human generations, then 
private control will totally eclipse social benefit, and limited monopolies will transform into 
absolute monopolies that will guarantee a profit even if the copyright owner must sue the 
customer in order to receive it. Granting such complete proprietary control of interminable 
copyrights to private ownership undermines the stated purpose of all copyright legislation, and 
51 
 
diminishes the public’s ability to educate itself. And while there is benefit in incentivizing 
authors with temporary economic monopolies, the words f John Milton may best express the 
ultimate danger of locking down the marketplace of ideas: 
Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolised and traded in by 
tickets and statutes, and standards. We must not think o make a staple commodity of all 
the knowledge in the Land, to mark and license it like our broad cloth, and our 
woolpacks.100 
 
Instead, it is in the best interests of society, economically and intellectually, to implement any 
new copyright legislation with the same integrity and sense of purpose that was intended by the 
framers of the Constitution, such that individuals may be rewarded for their intellectual efforts, 
but not interminably, and not at the expense of the public’s ability to educate itself. 
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